To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes by Chase, Christopher R.
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 8, Number 3 2003 Article 2
To Shred or Not to Shred: Document
Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of
Justice Statutes
Christopher R. Chase∗
∗
Copyright c©2003 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
TO SHRED OR NOT TO SHRED: DOCUMENT
RETENTION POLICIES AND FEDERAL
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE STATUTES
Christopher R. Chase*
INTRODUCTION
For numerous business and legal reasons, business entities,
both large and small, are developing complex document retention
policies1 in order to protect themselves and their bottom line.2
While these policies may have both economic and legal benefits, a
poorly developed or mismanaged policy may lead to violations of
or eliminate protection from the obstruction of justice laws of the
United States, particularly 18 U.S.C. sections 1503, 1505, 1512, and
the newly enacted sections 1519 and 1520, legislating the procedure
for destruction of documents.' Such was the case for Arthur
Andersen LLP ("Andersen"), formerly one of the Big Five'
J.D. received at Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law,
2002. The author would like to thank J. Bradley Bennett, Greg Faragasso, and
David Lipton for their comments.
1. See Neiley v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34580, at *15
(6th Cir. 1999) (noting State Farm's document retention policy); Brown v.
Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting Foot Locker's
document retention policy); Lewis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
16220, at *8 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing Caterpillar's document retention policy).
Such policies are referred to as "document retention policies" or "document
destruction policies," and are essentially the same thing. Throughout this Article,
I will refer to such policies as "document retention policies."
2. See, e.g., Lori Block, Which Documents Can Be Safely Destroyed? Record
Retention On Trial, Bus. INS., Mar. 9, 1992, at 1 (noting the rationales for the
development of document retention policies).
3. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512, 1519, 1520 (2002).
4. After the disintegration of Andersen, the Big Five are now the Big Four.
See Scot J. Paltrow, Companies Swap Fired Auditors, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2002, at
C1. The Big Four include KPMG International, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst
& Young LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Id.
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accounting firms of the United States, after the firm was indicted
on March 14, 2002, and subsequently convicted on June 15, 2002,'
on one count of obstruction of justice for destroying documents
related to the firm's work for the Enron Corporation ("Enron").6
Wrongful destruction of documents can lead to penalties in
both civil and criminal cases. In civil litigation, document
destruction can lead to an adverse inference before the jury as a
penalty for spoliation.' In the criminal context, and pertinent for
the present discussion, destroying documents can lead to a charge
of obstruction of justice Penalties in both the civil and criminal
contexts can have harsh effects on the party who destroys
documents: losing a jury trial because of the adverse inference or
being fined and imprisoned as a criminal punishment.
Corporate senior management must deal with many questions
regarding whether the company may destroy documents, when the
corporation is allowed to destroy the documents and how the
destruction should occur.
To avoid legal problems resulting from the destruction of
documents, a document retention policy must be routinely
5. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Al.
6. See Susan Schmidt & David S. Hilzenrath, Andersen Charged in
Shredding Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at Al. Andersen stated in an
internal report investigating the document destruction that the firm's policy
towards document retention when litigation was anticipated was not very clear.
Id.
7. One remedy for the destruction of evidence is an adverse inference
instruction to the jury. See Jerold Solovy & Robert Byman, Discovery-Evidence
Destruction, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at B12. "[T]he spoliation inference is a
logical deduction of guilt from the destruction of presumably incriminating
evidence." JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 5 (1989).
Additionally, an unreasonable document retention policy may justify granting a
motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) if evidence
was destroyed and could be found as fraud or other misconduct. See Jordan v.
Paccar, Inc., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25358, at *30 (6th Cir. 1996).
8. Both the United States and individual states themselves have obstruction
of justice laws. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512, 1519, 1520; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2809 (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-723 (1982); GA. CODE.
ANN. § 16-10-50 (1968).
DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
followed and diligently maintained.9 All employees must know
what to do with their documents and how to eliminate unnecessary
documents. Likewise, all supervisors must clearly state and remind
their employees of how the policy works. These techniques will
ensure that a properly designed policy will be consistently applied.
In Andersen's case, the accounting firm's document retention
policy states that their employees are only required to retain final
work papers supporting client audits and should destroy drafts,
notes and memos.'" If litigation is anticipated, however, all
documents related to such litigation are to be retained." Possible
factors leading to the obstruction charge against the firm include
the fact that the firm's employees did not adhere to this policy
correctly, this policy's ambiguity or the employees simply chose to
ignore it."
Part I of this Article will discuss document retention policies
and how they are established. Part II of this Article will present an
overview of the three older federal obstruction of justice laws that
are applicable to document destruction-sections 1503, 1505 and
1512'3-and the two new obstruction laws that were drafted to
combat document destruction itself.' Part III will focus on
Andersen's document retention policy and the firm's trouble due
to the Enron bankruptcy. Part IV will analyze the competing
purposes of document retention policies and federal obstruction of
9. See Block, supra note 2, at 1 ("If documents are destroyed pursuant to a
reasonable [sic] established document retention policy, the jury never hears that
documents were destroyed.").
10. See Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information-
Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No. 760 (Andersen's
document retention policy) §§ 3.1.1, 3.1.2, at http://www.washingtonpost.corn/wp-
srv/business/daily/transcripts/andersen-policy02Ol00.pdf (last visited, Mar. 2,
2003) [hereinafter Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information].
11. See id.
12. Apparently, the jurors convicted the firm, however, not for the shredding
of documents or the flawed policy, but because Andersen attorney Nancy
Temple requested that an Andersen partner remove her name from a memo,
thus altering it. See C. Bryson Hull, U.S. Files Opposition to Andersen Motion for
New Trial, REUTERS, July 31, 2002.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512.
14. Id. §§ 1519-1520.
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justice laws. Finally, this Article will conclude that document
retention policies are necessary for business purposes and can be
reconciled with the federal laws as long as the policy is clear,
consistently applied, well maintained and suspended when the
potential for litigation or a federal investigation arises.
I. DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
Companies, firms, and partnerships produce a multitude of
documents during their ordinary course of business. It is
impossible to keep all of these documents because of space
limitations and storage costs. 15 Therefore in an effort to manage
their paperwork and to deal with excess and unnecessary
documents, companies have turned to document retention
policies. 6 Such policies should be created in advance of document
destruction or during a neutral time without litigation. 7 In order to
avoid violating the law, however, these policies must clearly
describe what documents have to be retained and what documents
can be destroyed, as well as the appropriate time for destruction. 8
15. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 275.
16. See Online Exchange: Texaco and the Science of Shredding, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at 12 [hereinafter Online Exchange] ("The operative
principle regarding routine document destruction is if the documents do not
contain material that is useful in guiding future business operations (and the
documents are not otherwise required to be retained to meet legal standards),
then they can (and probably should) be destroyed."). Id. (stating comments of
Richard Gruner); see also Document Retention Polices: Evolving Beasts, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1998, at 46 ("[A] good document-retention policy helps a
company manage its paperwork, and that's the biggest benefit."). Because most
companies have document retention policies, destroying documents has become
a profitable business for shredding companies. There are around 600 shredding
companies and shredding services that generate an annual revenue of about $1.5
billion. See Michael Orey, Why We Now Need A National Association for Data
Destruction, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2002, at Al.
17. See Lisa Shaheen, Required Recordkeeping Sets the Record Straight, PEST
CONTROL, Apr. 1, 2001, at 27 (pointing out that it is unwise to develop a
document retention policy when the company is already involved in legal
proceedings).
18. Speaking of the necessity of a policy, one Washington, D.C. attorney
stated that "[w]ithout a policy, you're open to an allegation that there was some
DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
Most companies, firms, and partnerships have policies
designed to guarantee that outdated and otherwise useless
documents are not needlessly maintained.19 Moreover, routinely
reviewing and purging old files will prevent unnecessarily
damaging documents from coming to light.' Indeed, one of the
best reasons for having a formal policy is that it reduces legal
exposure through the destruction of possibly incriminating
evidence.2' No single document retention policy will suit all
companies; each business must create one that is specifically
tailored to its needs. Nevertheless, because a company has a duty
to preserve specific documents pursuant to federal laws and when
there is a possibility that litigation may be commenced, certain
requirements should be in all policies.' All policies should clearly
nefarious purpose for destruction of documents." Michael Orey, Accounting for
the Fall: Document Shredding Shows Importance of Having a Policy on What Is
Preserved, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002, at A6. Another Washington, D.C. attorney
stated that "you don't destroy anything until you have a 'document retention
policy' in place." Saundra Torry, Shredding: Decisions of Taste, Law and
Common Sense, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1994, at F7 (discussing law firms'
document retention policies).
19. See John McFadden & Joseph Wolfe, Record Retention Tips,
PRACTICING CPA, June 1, 2000, at 4 (noting that a formal document retention
policy is an important risk management tool for accountants and auditors).
20. See Online Exchange, supra note 16 (comments of William Carmell); see
also Dave Lindorff, The New Corporate Motto: Shred Carefully (discussing the
case of the industrial corporation Owens-Corning, which was forced into
bankruptcy after numerous liability suits due to the discovery of old notes and
memos from the 1940's and 50's), available at
http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/display.asp?articleid=86 (last visited Mar. 2,
2003). Indeed, even a senior Andersen partner acknowledged during testimony
that the document policy was intended to keep information from potential
litigants. See Eichenwald, supra note 5, at Al.
21. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 277. This also reduces litigation
costs because there will not be as many documents to produce. See id. at 303. Of
course, plaintiffs and their attorneys are skeptical of such practical reasons for
retention policies and would like to see all documents ever created. One such
attorney noted that: "I think companies are destroying documents not because
storing them is a problem but because of concerns about potential liability
issues." Lindorff, supra note 20.
22. See Orey, supra note 16, at Al.
23. Federal employment laws require companies to retain documents
2003] 725
726 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
state the categorization of documents and electronic files, what
documents must be preserved, the retention- period for each
category, the document destruction procedures, and what to do
when litigation or an investigation commences.24
In order for a document retention plan to be of value, the
policy should be strictly and routinely followed.' Document
retention policies may work against a company when a subpoena is
issued or an official proceeding begins if the company's employees
have violated the policy in the past.26 To ensure strict compliance,
regardless of whether litigation is foreseeable. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.14,
1627.3, 516.5 (2002) (requiring companies to retain documents pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act).
Employment records, time sheets, and wage and hour data, for example, must be
retained for one to six years. See Michael Starr & Jordan Lippner, Spoliation By
Oversight, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A19. Additionally, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act requires companies to keep documents pertaining to an
employee's exposure to toxic substances for thirty years. Id. Following section
1520 in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, auditors must keep all substantive material
related to the performed audit, regardless if the material is the final conclusion or
inapposite to the final conclusions. See 148 CONG. REC. S7419 (daily ed. July 26,
2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
24. See Robert M. Barker et al., Document Retention, INTERNAL AUDITOR,
Dec. 1, 1996, at 48.
25. Michael R. Overly, Electronic Document Retention: Reducing Potential
Liability for E-mail, 23 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 11 (2001) (stating
that liability can be limited if a company adopts and consistently follows a
uniform retention policy); see also Stephanie Ingersoll, Enron Officials Grilled,
Former Top Auditor Invokes Fifth Amendment at House Hearing
Enron/Andersen Document Destruction Timeline, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
158, 164 (2002) (noting that according to two accountants, the most important
quality pertaining to document retention policies is that the policy must be
applied reasonably and consistently). In order to pass judicial muster, policies
should contain the following features: document destruction should be carried
out in the ordinary course of business; destruction should follow an aging scheme;
it should be carried out in an arbitrary and consistent manner; and a mechanism
should be included to suspend document destruction if management has notice of
an investigation or judicial proceeding. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at
314-15.
26. John M. Fedders, Lecture at the Catholic University of America's
Columbus School of Law (Feb. 18, 2002).
DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
management should inform all employees of the policy and clearly
announce what procedures need to be followed.' Companies may
also "issue periodic reminders" to make sure that the company is
adhering to the policy. 28 It is of great importance that the company
makes sure that employees know of and how to deal with the
document retention policy.
Once any judicial or investigative proceeding is contemplated
or begins, companies should automatically suspend their document
retention policies.2 ' A company should send out a "red alert letter"
that will tell employees to save documents related to the
proceeding." Upon receiving a subpoena, the company should
suspend any document destruction policy it has in order to prevent
the destruction of responsive documents.3' Attorneys for the
organization should specifically express what types of documents
need to be preserved by the organization and constantly remind
employees to ensure that no post-request destruction occurs.32
27. See Barker et al., supra note 24, at 49; In re the Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 615 (D.N.J. 1997) (penalizing Prudential
for destroying documents during a class-action law suit and criticizing senior
management for never directing a court order regarding preservation of
documents be disseminated to all employees and relying on others to discuss the
company's policy on document retention). Management should also make clear
that the purpose of the policy is not to cover up dishonesty or destroy evidence.
See Julian Joshua, European Union: Antitrust Compliance Programmes for
Multinational Companies, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 1, 2001, at 6569.
28. Barker et al., supra note 24, at 49.
29. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 276 (stating that organizations can
be vulnerable to sanctions if they do not suspend their programs). One in-house
attorney stated that whenever the legal department recognizes a situation of
litigation or when it's important to keep certain documents, he notifies
management to preserve such records. See Document Retention Policies, supra
note 16.
30. Fedders, supra note 26. Fedders said that this letter should go to every
department, the attorneys and accountants of each department and any outside
group that worked on the issue at hand. Id. Most importantly, the letter should
go to reasonably foreseeable people who would be involved in such document
destruction. Id.
31. See Benito Romano, Criminal Investigations of Accounting Irregularities:
A Primer for Company Counsel, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2001, at 16.
32. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 304.
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Most courts will not punish evidence destruction pursuant to
an organization's policy.3  The policies, however, must be
reasonable and have a purpose, as opposed to a sham policy
created to destroy unfavorable evidence in anticipation of
litigation. 4 It is important to note that a document retention policy
does not guarantee that destruction will not give rise to sanctions
or an adverse inference." When looking at a policy during the
course of a product liability suit, the Eighth Circuit remarked that
when a court reviews a policy to determine if it is reasonable, the
court should look at the facts and circumstances surrounding the
relevant documents. 6 Additionally, another court has asserted that
destroying documents in the absence of a document retention
policy is evidence of bad faith on the part of an organization.'
33. See, e.g., Moore v. Gen. Motors, 558 S.W.2d 720, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
("[W]e see no evidence of fraud or bad faith in a corporation destroying records
it is no longer required by law to keep and which are destroyed in accord with its
regular practices."); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 280-81 n.30
(citing cases that did not punish companies who destroyed evidence according to
the organization's document destruction policy).
34. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 291 (stating that courts have struck a
corporate defendant's answer because of a sham policy) (citing In re Comair Air
Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. 350 (E.D. Ky. 1983)); see also Carlucci v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 485-86 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (ordering the entry of a
default judgment against the defendant after finding that the destruction of
documents with the intention of preventing them from being produced in law
suits was not a bona fide policy).
35. Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988)
("Thus, a corporation cannot blindly destroy documents and expect to be
shielded by a seemingly innocuous retention policy.").
36. See id.
37. See generally Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107
(S.D. Fla. 1987).
While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its
possession once a complaint is filed, it is under a duty to preserve what it
knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely
to be requested during discovery, and/or is the subject of a pending discovery
request.
DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
II. FEDERAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE STATUTES RELATING TO
THE DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
The purpose of the federal obstruction of justice statutes is to
protect the honor and integrity of proceedings before the federal
judiciary, proceedings before federal agencies, and proceedings
before Congress.38 While there were eighteen sections in the
obstruction of justice chapter of Title 18, three sections in
particular dealt with the destruction of documents prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"): 18 U.S.C.
sections 1503, 1505 and 1512-sections 1503 and 1505 concerning
the obstruction of justice and section 1512 explicitly forbidding the
destruction of evidence by tampering with a witness, victim or
informant.39 Sarbanes-Oxley has created two new obstruction of
justice laws that specifically alter the destruction or alteration of
documents and evidence: 18 U.S.C. section 1519, as a general anti-
shredding law, and section 1520, as a retention of audit workpapers
law."0 These two provisions, drafted in response to the recent
corporate scandals and document destruction in the Andersen
case, are protective measures, designed to preserve documents and
punish those who destroy such documents without having to use
the different elements of sections 1503, 1505, and 1512.41
Obstruction charges are rather straightforward and something
the government will typically pursue because prosecutors do not
have to prove that a defendant was involved in any underlying
crime. 2 Prosecutors only need to show that the defendant lied,
38. See Tracey B. Fitzpatrick & Stacey L. Parker, Obstruction of Justice, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 747,748 (1994).
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512 (2002).
40. Id. §§ 1519-1520.
41. 148 CONG. REC. S7358 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(describing the importance of having these provisions in order to preserve
evidence for possible action, Senator Leahy stated: "[i]t only takes a few seconds
to warm up the shredder, but unfortunately it will take years for victims to put
this complex case back together again.").
42. See Richard B. Schmitt et al., Accounting for Enron: Obstruction Charges
Likely to Be First Step in Enron Criminal Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A6.
2003] 729
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destroyed evidence or otherwise hindered the government's case."
For companies with document retention policies, it is important to
understand when destruction of documents becomes criminal.
A. 18 U.S. C. Section 1503-Obstruction of Justice Generally
Section 1503 is the original obstruction of justice statute,
dating back to 1831 when Congress enacted a statute condemning
obstruction of justice in general terms.' This statute currently
remains in force, with only minor amendments made since 1831."5
It was not until the late 1950's, however, that the first reported
cases applying this statute to destruction of evidence were
decided. 6
The pertinent language of section 1503 relating to the
destruction of documents is located in the "omnibus clause" of the
statute, wherein "[w]hoever... corruptly or by threats or force, or
by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs
or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice, shall be punished."'47  Because the
omnibus clause is liberally worded, federal courts construe the
language as reaching a large amount of activities. 48 Although
seemingly broad, courts have limited the scope of criminal liability
under section 1503 by requiring that some form of judicial
proceeding be actually pending and the defendant have notice of
such proceeding. Indeed, the Supreme Court has determined that
43. Id. (noting that the government likes the obstruction angle in a corporate
criminal case because it is relatively easy to establish the facts).
44. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 8.
45. See id.
46. See United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 263
F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1959); see also United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2002).
48. See Edward Brodsky, Think Before You Shred That Document, N.Y. L.J.,
July 6, 1998, at 4; see also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995)
(stating that the omnibus clause serves as a catchall prohibition).
49. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599; United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641
(1st Cir. 1996) (determining that there was no evidence showing that the
defendant knew or had notice of the pending grand jury proceeding).
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the omnibus provision requires a "nexus" in time, causation or
logic between the act and the judicial proceeding.'
While the language of the statute does not include the specific
act of document destruction, interfering with the "due
administration of justice" has been construed as extending to
destroying, altering or concealing documents because the statute
prohibits the willful destruction of evidence relevant to pending
judicial proceedings.5 To convict a person or corporation under
section 1503 for document destruction, the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 1) destroyed
relevant documents 2) that the defendant knew were relevant 3) to
a pending judicial proceeding 4) for the purpose of interfering with
the administration of justice.
50. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599 (citing precedent from 1893, wherein the
court held that "a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding
the due administration of justice in a court unless it appears that he knew or had
notice that justice was being administrated in such court.").
51. See United States v. Lench, 806 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1986)
(determining that concealment of documents subpoenaed by grand jury violates
section 1503); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1981)
("[C]oncealing and attempting to conceal certain ledgers and notebooks after
receiving a grand jury subpoena duces tecum" can "fall within the prohibition of
the statute."); United States v. Faudman, 640 F.2d 20, 21, 23 (6th Cir. 1981) ("We
believe prosecution of the defendant in the present case was properly founded on
18 U.S.C. section 1503," when defendant "alter[ed] or destroy[ed] corporate
records with knowledge that the records [were] being sought by a grand jury.");
United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d.460, 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that failing
to produce subpoenaed documents is not actionable under section 1503 unless
there is affirmative conduct such as destruction, concealment, or removal); Nissei
Sangyo Am., Ltd. v. United States, 31 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Federal law
prohibits 'corrupt endeavors to obstruct justice,' 18 U.S.C. section 1503, and this
provision has been read to forbid the willful destruction of evidence."); see also
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (noting that the general obstruction of
justice statute has been construed to forbid destruction of evidence).
52. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 175; see also Rasheed, 663 F.2d at
852. Other commentators have described the elements as: i) there was a pending
federal judicial proceeding; ii) the defendant knew of the proceeding; and iii) the
defendant acted corruptly with the intent to obstruct or interfere with the due
administration of justice, endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the
proceeding. See Michael B. Himmel & Christopher S. Porrino, Document
Destruction May Constitute Pre-Subpoena Obstruction of Justice, N.J. L.J., Feb. 1,
2003]
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Under section 1503 there is no requirement that the destroyed
documents be admissible into evidence or material to the criminal
proceeding. 3 This obstruction statute only requires that the
documents be relevant to the inquiry or proceeding. 4 The Southern
District of New York declared that the documents or notes in
question need only bear a reasonable relationship to the inquiry or
"be relevant to the inquiry" to be covered by the statute.5 The
court further announced that the word material is not in section
1503 nor does it say "the acts condemned must be in relation to a
matter 'material' to an action or proceeding."56 Additionally, when
considering the materiality of certain documents, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the issue "is not whether the government needed the
information, but whether [the defendant] tried to conceal evidence
he had an obligation to provide."'
The second element of a section 1503 violation for document
destruction is a requirement that the defendant knew of the
document's relevance to a pending judicial proceeding. 8 When
discussing this element of obstruction of justice, the Supreme
Court asserted that it was necessary for the accused to have
knowledge or notice of judicial proceedings before he could be
found guilty of obstruction or endeavoring to obstruct the
administration of justice. 9 Moreover, the knowledge element only
requires a reasonably subjective belief by the defendant.'
A more difficult element to prove is the pendency of a judicial
proceeding. For a violation of section 1503 for document
destruction, an individual or corporation must interfere with
judicial procedure by destroying documents.6 There is, however,
1999, at 32.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2002).
54. Id.
55. United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 263
F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1959).
56. Id. at 373-74.
57. United States v. Lench, 806 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
59. See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 205 (1893).
60. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 177 (citing United States v. Vesich, 724
F.2d 451, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1984)).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Section 1503 only applies to "judicial proceedings." Id.
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no bright-line test to determine when a judicial proceeding begins
under section 1503.62 It could begin when a grand jury is
empanelled63 or when a complaint has been filed. ' Courts take into
account all of the specific facts of the case to determine when
judicial proceedings begin rather than looking towards one formal
act that would create pendency.65
Courts typically use a pragmatic test to determine whether the
pendency requirement of section 1503 is satisfied. For instance,
the Third Circuit refused to adopt a rigid test that a grand jury
proceeding is not pending until the grand jury has heard testimony,
but rather held that empanelling of the grand jury and the issuance
of subpoenas were enough to establish pendency.66 The Fifth
Circuit found pendency where a grand jury had been empanelled
and the witness had signed a written agreement to testify before a
grand jury.67 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
pendency requirement was satisfied when the jury was empanelled
and subpoenas had been issued even though appearance before the
grand jury could be waived and subpoenaed documents were
Therefore, obstructing an investigation conducted by Congress or a United States
agency cannot be punished under this section. Rather, section 1505 covers this
type of obstruction. Id. § 1505.
62. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 178-83 (discussing the differing
views as to when judicial proceedings begin).
63. See John M. Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention and
Destruction: Practical, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 5, 21 (1980) (arguing that once the grand jury is empanelled and subpoenas
are issued, the judicial proceedings have begun). Fedders and Guttenplan
believe that a party will probably be protected from section 1503 liability if he or
she destroys a document before a grand jury proceeding has commenced. See id.
64. See United Stated v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that
section 1503 is "not applicable until a complaint ha[s] been filed with a United
States Commissioner"); United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir.
1970). One commentator wrote that "[s]ection 1503 apparently allows parties to
destroy any document ... if the destruction occurs before the complaint is filed."
Dale A. Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for An Opponent's Inappropriate
Destruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1185, 1201 (1983).
65. See supra notes 62-64.
66. See United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1975).
67. See United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 1984).
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handed over to the FBI rather than the grand jury." Conversely,
one District Court declined to find pendency where a grand jury
was empanelled but no subpoenas had been issued, nor was the
grand jury notified of the investigation.69 Moreover, not looking at
the context of a grand jury, the Ninth Circuit held that section 1503
is not applicable until a complaint has been filed with a United
States Commissioner.'
As courts have rejected a rigid, formal test for deciding when a
proceeding begins under section 1503, it is possible that persons or
corporations can obstruct justice by acting in pre-subpoena
document destruction.7 Knowledge of a likely subpoena or grand
jury investigation may be enough to fulfill the pendency
requirement.72 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania punished pre-
68. See United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1984).
69. See United States v. Ellis, 652 F. Supp. 1451, 1453 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
70. See United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1970).
71. See 58 AM. JUR. 2d Obstructing Justice § 22 (2002) (stating that one can
still be guilty of obstruction even though no subpoena was served); see also David
S. Hilzenrath, Data Destruction Intensifies Andersen's Woes, WASH. POST, Jan.
11, 2002, at El (looking at the context of section 1505, a former federal
prosecutor stated that "[e]ven before authorities have subpoenaed records,
destroying them can expose people to charges of criminal obstruction if they are
aware that Congress or a government agency is conducting an inquiry into a
matter and is likely to seek the records."). In 1994, Harvey Pitt, the former
Chairman of the SEC, argued that a company should develop a procedure for
determining document retention and that destruction should be halted when a
subpoena was about to be issued. See Harvey Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
When Bad Things Happen to Good Companies: A Crisis Management Primer, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 951, 961, 968 (1994). However, many lawyers, including some
in the Justice Department, say that Pitt's earlier view of the time to suspend
destruction is incorrect. See David Lindorff, supra note 20. Instead, they believe
that a company should suspend its policy because when it should reasonably
know of an investigation. Id.
72. See Michael B. Himmel & Christopher S. Porrino, Document Destruction
May Constitute Pre-Subpoena Obstruction of Justice, N.J. L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 32
("The relevant question is whether the company or individual is aware of a
pending judicial proceeding in which the documents likely will be sought in the
future."). As obstruction charges do not require subpoenas to be issued or
served, one commentator suggests that "[o]nce counsel is aware of the
government's investigation, counsel should act as if the company has already
received a subpoena." David B. Fein, Innocuous Decisions May Exonerate
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subpoena document destruction under section 1503 when a
defendant persuaded a third party to destroy a letter implicating
the defendant in a RICO action.73 The court determined that a
person who knows a grand jury is engaging in an investigation and
who believes that a certain document may become relevant to such
investigations can be convicted for obstruction by destroying such
document." The Fourth Circuit sustained the conviction of a
defendant who destroyed documents pre-subpoena, holding that
"[t]he documents do not have to be under subpoena; it is sufficient
if the defendant is aware that the grand jury will likely seek the
documents in its investigation."75 More importantly, the Second
Circuit has indicated that "destroying documents in anticipation of
a subpoena can constitute obstruction."76 There the court found
that an obstruction conviction was proper even though the
destruction of documents occurred pre-subpoena, because the
defendant destroyed the documents after learning of a FBI
investigation.'
The final requirement of a section 1503 violation involves the
intent of the violator. When interpreting this section, courts
require that "one must impede the due administration of justice
with the general intent of knowledge as well as the specific intent
of purpose to obstruct."" The term "corruptly" in section 1503
essentially describes the specific intent of the crime. Yet, courts
have split over the exact meaning of "corruptly", some requiring a
corrupt motive79 and others stating that the term "corruptly" simply
Corporate Dilemma When Prosecutors Are Sniffing Around, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
28, 1998, at S46.
73. See generally United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
affd mem., 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1977).
74. See id. at 202 (reasoning that empanelment of the grand jury was enough
for pendency).
75. United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1988).
76. United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 450 (2d Cir. 1991).
77. See id. at 445-46.
78. United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985).
79. See United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cintolo, 818
F.2d 980, 991 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1971).
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means that the act must be done with the purpose of obstructing
justice."0
B. 18 U.S. C. Section 1505-Obstruction of Agency and
Congressional Proceedings
Section 1505 concerns the obstruction of pending agency and
congressional proceedings." While the first section of the statute
specifically regards the Antitrust Civil Process Act, the second
section is the omnibus provision, which is very similar to section
1503's omnibus provision in breadth.82 Likewise, the pertinent
language regarding document destruction is located in the omnibus
clause:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening
letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper
administration of the law under which any pending proceeding
is being had before any department or agency of the United
States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry
under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either
House, or any committee of either House or any joint
committee of Congress... shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 3
Much like section 1503, in order to convict a person or
corporation under section 1505 for document destruction, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the
defendant (1) destroyed relevant documents (2) that the defendant
knew were relevant (3) to a pending agency or congressional
proceeding or civil investigative demand (4) for the purpose of
obstructing justice."'
80. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating
that corruptly "means that the act must be done with the purpose of obstructing
justice."); United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1984).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2002).
82. Id. § 1503.
83. Id. § 1505.
84. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 185; see also United States v. Price, 951
F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1991) (considering three elements of a section 1505
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Only if documents are relevant to a pending agency or
congressional proceeding will document destruction violate section
1505.85 For example, the Northern District of Ohio upheld an
indictment charging the defendant with altering documents during
a Senate proceeding against a motion to dismiss.86 The indictment
alleged that the document altered and partially "destroyed bore a
reasonable relation to the subject of the Committee's inquiry. ""
Additionally, the knowledge requirement, much like in section
1503, requires that the defendant knew of the document's
relevancy and of the pending agency or congressional proceeding.88
It is unclear whether actual notice is required or whether likely
suspicion of a proceeding is sufficient for this requirement. 9 One
commentary maintains that if a defendant should have known of a
document's relevance and a concurrent proceeding, he might be
imputed with knowledge. °
Construed even more flexibly than under section 1503, courts
give the element of pendency more breadth. An agency or
congressional proceeding no longer limits itself to formal activities
in a court of law.8' A pending proceeding can be found as early as a
notification of potential violations92 and as late as a formal order of
investigation.93  Yet, many periods in between can also be
considered a pending proceeding, such as during the
preinvestigation period," during an informal inquiry," during an
violation: a pending proceeding before a department or agency of the United
States; the defendant is aware of the pending proceedings; and the defendant
intentionally endeavored corruptly to influence, obstruct or impede the pending
proceeding).
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
86. See United States v. Presser, 187 F. Supp. 64, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd,
292 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1961), affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 371
U.S. 71 (1962).
87. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
89. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 186.
90. See Fedders & Guttenplan, supra note 63, at 25.
91. See United States v. Browning, Inc., 572 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1978).
92. See Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712-15 (8th Cir. 1966).
93. See United States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492, 493-94 (D.D.C. 1964).
94. See Browning, 572 F.2d at 722-25 (discussing a Bureau of Customs
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IRS investigation,96 and during an INS proceeding.9 7 Due to such a
broad and flexible approach as to when agency or congressional
proceedings are pending,98 anyone who considers destroying
documents may be covered by section 1505 if the proceeding is
imminent or reasonably foreseeable.9
The final requirement regarding the purpose of obstructing or
impeding the administration of the law is exactly the same as
discussed previously concerning section 1503."°
C. 18 U.S. C. Section 1512-Tampering With a Witness, Victim or
Informant
Section 1512 was passed to specifically prevent tampering with
a witness, victim or informant, permitting prosecutors to use
section 1512, instead of those sections dealing with obstruction of
justice. Although Congress passed this section in order to remedy
perceived inadequacies under section 1503 concerning witness
tampering, section 1512 also forbids document destruction."' The
applicable language for document destruction is:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or
engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with
intent to-2) cause or induce any person to-A) withhold
testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object from
an official proceeding; B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an
object with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability
for use in an official proceeding; shall be fined under this title or
investigation inquiry).
95. See United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 1970)
(discussing a Federal Trade Commission inquiry).
96. See United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976).
97. See United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1970).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Tallant, 407 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(stating that section 1505 may be considered broad enough to include falsifying
records in anticipation of an agency subpoena).
99. Fedders & Guttenplan, supra note 63, at 25.
100. See generally supra Part II.A.
101. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Andersen Fiasco, NAT'L L. J., Feb 11, 2002, at
A19 (stating that section 1512 extends the net of criminal liability).
DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
(f) For the purpose of this section-i) an official proceeding
need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the
offense; and 2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other
object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a claim of
privilege.'0 2
Thus, a violation of section 1512 can occur when a defendant
1) knowingly 2) coerces or attempts to coerce another person, or
misleads the other person 3) to withhold a document from an
official proceeding or alter or destroy a document in order to
render it unavailable for use in the proceeding 4) specifically
intending this result.
10 3
Similar to sections 1503 and 1505, this section includes the
elements of knowledge and specific intent."' Contrary to the other
two sections, however, it is not necessary to act "corruptly"
according to the statutory language; "[the defendant] need only
perform one of the enumerated acts with the intent to 'influence'
testimony" rather than acting with a corrupt purpose.1°'
Nevertheless, as written before Sarbanes-Oxley, section 1512 was
limited by its own language-it only covered the acts of an
individual who coerced a third party to destroy documents, 6 rather
than the person who actually destroyed the documents."
Moreover, section 1512 does not cover the acts of a defendant who
did not mislead the witness while persuading the witness to lie.' 8
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2002).
103. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 189; 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).
105. Fitzpatrick & Parker, supra note 38, at 764.
106. See id.
107. Senator Leahy noted that the technical provision only makes it a crime to
persuade another to destroy documents, and it's not a crime to destroy them
yourself, something that section 1519 will correct. See 148 CONG. REc. S7419
(daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
108. United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1985) (determining
that a defendant who attempts to persuade the witness to lie to the government
without misleading the witness has not violated section 1512). It is important to
note that an attorney may be prosecuted as an aider or abettor since a third
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Although the section requires an official proceeding as in
sections 1503 and 1505, section 1512 eliminates language
concerning pendency of an official proceeding or the initiation of a
proceeding at the time of the alleged illegal conduct."° Taking an
expansive view of the section, the District of Rhode Island
determined that a violation occurred even though neither official
proceedings nor any investigation had begun at the time that the
corporate defendant's employee removed and altered documents
respecting a price-fixing conspiracy."' In that case, the office
manager's instructions to an employee respecting such documents
were strong circumstantial evidence that the manager intended to
affect testimony by altering the documents because she "realized
that a federal proceeding could be commenced in the future."'
Consequently, it is sufficient for an official proceeding to be
instituted at a date after the document destruction or alteration for
a violation to occur as long as there was an intent to alter or render
documents unavailable in any such proceeding."'
Even though section 1512(e) appears to ease the burdens of
prosecutors when seeking obstruction of justice violations, courts
are divided on whether the defendant must know that an official
proceeding is imminent or scheduled. Relying on the language in
subsection (e), some courts do not require the defendant to have
such knowledge."3 The Fifth Circuit, however, requires "at least a
person does the destroying under this statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1055
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651 (1st Cir. 1996).
110. United States v. Conneaut Indus., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 116 (D.R.I. 1994)
("Nor do we adopt the Conneaut opinion insofar as it might be read as allowing
conviction in any case where there is some circumstantial evidence that the
defendant may have foreseen an official proceeding at some time in the future.
Each case must be evaluated on its own facts.").
111. Id. at 125. John C. Coffee, Jr. argues that under this expansive reading,
"targeted document destruction would never be safe once the decision-maker
was specifically aware that misconduct has occurred and might be investigated in
the future." Coffee, supra note 101, at A19.
112. See Coffee, supra note 101, at A19. This statute may also reach conduct
that occurs during an informal investigatory stage of proceedings. See Gonzalez,
922 F. 2d at 1055; Frankhauser, 80 F.3d at 646.
113. See United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United
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circumstantial showing of intent to affect testimony at some
particular federal proceeding that is ongoing or is scheduled" for
the future.'14  Even so, the inclusion of subsection (e) has
eliminated the more difficult questions appearing in sections 1503
and 1505 concerning the pendency of a proceeding and the
defendant's knowledge of such.
A new subsection has been added to section 1512 to catch the
individual who alters or destroys the document or other object,
rather than just the "corrupt persuader.""' The newly inserted sub-
section (c) was created by Sarbanes-Oxley in an attempt to create
corporate fraud accountability and "prevent persons from
tampering with a record or otherwise impeding an official
proceeding.""..6 Thus, after pushing former sub-sections (c) through
(i) down a slot, section 1512(c) reads:
Whoever corruptly-(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals
a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with
the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use
in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences,
or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both."7
Therefore, what was seen as a technical distinction (punishing
the persuader only) burdening prosecutors has now been lifted
with the inclusion of language to prosecute the document destroyer
himself."8
D. 18 U.S.C. Section 1519-Destruction. Alteration, or Falsification
of Records in Federal Investigations and Bankruptcy
In order to close technical loopholes and clarify the existing
States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1984).
114. United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1991).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002).
116. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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obstruction of justice laws that cover document destruction,"9 and
in response to the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to "deter and punish
corporate and accounting fraud and corruption."'2 In Title VIII of
the Act, a new general anti-shredding provision was enacted at 18
U.S.C. section 1519:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or
contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
2 1
Unlike the three previous obstruction statutes that were a
narrowly interpreted patchwork of laws governing the destruction
of evidence, this new section can "be effectively used in a wide
array of cases where a person destroys or creates evidence with the
intent to obstruct an investigation or matter that is, as a factual
matter, within the jurisdiction of any federal agency or any
bankruptcy."'" As summed up by Senator Leahy, the drafter of
Title VIII, "[t]he intent of the provision is simple: people should
not be destroying, altering, or falsifying documents to obstruct any
government function.""
Section 1519 is meant to correct the ambiguities and technical
119. 148 CONG. REc. S7419 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). Senator Leahy drafted the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act, which became Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
This Title includes the new sections 1519 and 1520. Id. Senator Leahy provided a
section-by-section analysis for these new provisions. Id.
120. President's Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1286 (July 30, 2002); David S. Hilzenrath,
Andersen's Collapse May Be Boon to Survivors, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2002, at
E01 (stating that passage of the law was in response to the accounting scandals).
121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802.
122. 148 CONG. REc. S7418 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
123. Id. at S7419.
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limitations found in the interpretations of sections 1503, 1505, and
1512 by federal courts. 24 Unlike the narrow interpretation of
section 1503 that requires any obstruction to be tied to a pending
judicial proceeding,25 section 1519 is designed "not to include a
technical requirement.., to tie the obstructive conduct to a
pending or imminent proceeding or matter by intent or
otherwise."'26  Because section 1519 extends to acts done in
contemplation of a federal matter or bankruptcy case, "the timing
of the act in relation to the beginning of the matter or investigation
is also not a bar to prosecution."'" This section is also meant to
eliminate the distinctions recognized in section 1505 between court
proceedings, agency investigations, informal or formal
administrative proceedings, and basic government inquiries." Any
action named by this statute performed during an investigation or
matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency is covered. '29
Finally, the problem of section 1512 covering only the "corrupt
persuader" is rectified by section 1519 because the new section
extends coverage beyond the persuader and covers the document
destroyer himself.3 °
Although there are no court decisions interpreting this section
yet, the legislative history makes it apparent that section 1519 was
enacted to purposely target document destruction and alteration in
connection with a federal agency action.'3' Congress's serious
intent in deterring document destruction is evidenced by the
possible 20-year prison sentence that one may receive if found
guilty under such section.3 2  The concern that document
124. See id.
125. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995).
126. 148 CONG. REC. S7419.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. The penalties for destroying documents and obstructing justice have been
strengthened with this statute, but the twenty-year maximum penalty itself is an
expansion of what was originally promulgated by the first bill. See 148 CONG.
REc. E1451 (daily ed. July 29, 2002) (statement of Rep. Sununu). Moreover, to
show that Congress means business, section 805 of Title VIII requires the United
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destruction would go unpunished because of the varied
interpretations of the patchwork of obstruction laws covering
document destruction should be alleviated with the broad language
of this new section.
E. 18 U.S. C. Section 1520-Destruction of Corporate Audit Records
Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also created section 1520
to preserve an accountant's audit workpapers for five years from
the end of the fiscal period in which the audit was concluded.'33
Specifically targeting the document destruction performed by
accountants during the recent corporate scandals, this section
requires the retention of audit and review workpapers for a certain
period of time so that evidence can be gathered before the statute
of limitations for bringing certain securities and criminal actions
runs." Creating a new 10-year felony that applies to the willful
failure to preserve audit papers of companies that issue securities,
this section states:
(a)(1) Any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of
securities to which section 1OA(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-1(a)) applies, shall maintain all audit
or review workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of
the fiscal period in which the audit or review was concluded.
(b) Whoever knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a)(1),
or any rule or regulation promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission under subsection (a)(2), shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
States Sentencing Commission to review and possibly enhance the types of
penalties given out to offenders of the obstruction statutes. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
133. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802.
134. See 148 CONG. REC. S7419 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (mentioning specifically Andersen and its acts).
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802. Sub-section (a)(2) of this section requires the
SEC to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the retention of relevant
audit records. Moreover, sub-section (c) states that nothing in this section
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As opposed to the other obstruction sections that apply to
document destruction, this section pursues a specific audience-
accountants.' 36 According to the legislative history of this section,
the overriding purpose of targeting such persons and specific
documents is the preservation of financial and audit records.37 Not
only does this section penalize the willful failure to preserve
specific audit records, it also "will result in clear and reasonable
rules that will require accountants to put strong safeguards in place
to ensure that such corporate records are retained.' 3' The
materials requiring preservation under this section must be
substantive materials, "whether or not the conclusions, opinions,
analyses or data in such records support the final conclusions
reached by the auditor or expressed in the final audit or review,' 39
and specifically include e-mails and other electronic records.'
Similar to section 1519, the federal courts have not interpreted
this new section yet. Section 1520, however, is the least ambiguous
of the five obstruction sections targeting document retention and
destruction. It specifically states the situation and time period
wherein documents must be retained, and additionally gives the
SEC the power to create or clarify rules further define this
section. 4' On the other hand, it is more limited than the other four
sections because section 1520 only punishes and prohibits an
accountant who conducts an audit of a 1934 Act issuer.'
4 2
III. ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE ENRON
CORPORATION
In 2001, Arthur Andersen LLP ("Andersen"), the venerable
89 year-old accounting firm, became a lead character in the play
relieves a person of the duties imposed by other federal or state laws to retain
documents.
136. 148 CONG. REc. S7419.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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that was the downfall of Enron, an international energy-trading
company. 3 For Andersen, Enron's longtime outside auditor,'" it
was a part that it should never have taken. The drama began to
unfold during the second week of October 2001, when Enron
reported a $618 million third-quarter loss and disclosed a $1.2
billion reduction in shareholder equity as a result of terminating
transactions related to clandestine partnership arrangements. 15
After this disclosure, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") began to informally investigate the loss by sending a letter
to Enron on October 17, 2001146 which Enron only acknowledged
on October 22, 2001.' Following two months of questions about,
and investigations into, the Enron situation, Andersen disclosed to
federal agencies that Andersen employees disposed of "a
significant but undetermined number" of documents related to the
firm's work for Enron.1 48 Determining that Andersen should be
held accountable for any interference with investigations into
Enron's demise, the Department of Justice charged Andersen with
obstruction of justice and a grand jury indicted the firm on March
143. Enron was formed in 1985, when two natural gas pipeline companies
were combined, and was transformed into a powerful supplier of gas and
electricity. See Dan Morgan & Peter Behr, Enron Chief Quits As Hearings Open,
WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2002, at Al ("In the 1990s it created a vast, complex energy
and commodity trading operation marked by increasingly elaborate outside
partnership structures that are a central focus of the Enron investigations."). The
corporation filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr.
& Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron's Collapse: The Overview; Enron Corp. Files
Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3. 2001, at Al.
144. See Jonathan Weil et al., Audit Nightmare: Arthur Andersen Says It
Disposed of Documents That Related to Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at Al.
145. Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron May Issue More Stock to
Cover Obligations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2001, at A2. The loss of shareholder
equity was due to Enron's repurchasing of fifty-five million shares of its own
stock held by partnerships directed by Enron's CFO, Andrew Fastow. See Peter
Behr, Enron Discloses SEC Inquiry; Information Request Involves Ties to Money-
Losing Partnerships, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at E3.
146. Marcy Gordon, Arthur Andersen Says Auditors Destroyed Enron
Documents After SEC Request, AP NEWSWIRES, Jan. 15, 2002.
147. See Behr, supra note 145, at E3.
148. Weil et al., supra note 144, at Al.
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7, 20022"9 According to one expert on corporate and securities law,
"[w]hether or not this is a crime, it's a colossal blunder."'5
The indictment and subsequent conviction has led to the
departure of numerous Andersen clients,'5' the sell-off of profitable
units, and the exodus of partners and personnel.52 After being
convicted of this felony, Andersen lost its ability to audit clients on
any of the national stock exchanges. '53 Andersen was also fined
$500,000 and was sentenced to five years probation."' The firm is a
shadow of its former self and has virtually disintegrated, with only
200 to 300 of its former 28,000 workers left on the payroll.
1 55
149. See Schmidt & Hilzenrath, supra note 6, at Al; see also Mitchell Pacelle
et al., Auditor's Concerns: In Wake of Enron, Andersen Is Looking for a White
Knight, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2002, at Al (according to one person close to the
Department of Justice's investigation, "justice has a lot of power. Andersen has
no leverage" because it admitted that its employees had destroyed relevant
Enron documents even after Andersen learned of an SEC inquiry into Enron).
Prosecutors unsealed the indictment on March 14, 2002. See Brenda Sapino
Jeffreys, Andersen Defense Bets on Speedy Trial, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at
19.
150. David S. Hilzenrath & Susan Schmidt, Andersen Dismisses Lead Enron
Auditor, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at Al (discussing comments by John C.
Coffee, Jr., a law professor at Columbia University, describing the document
destruction to which Andersen admitted).
151. See Hull, supra note 12 (noting that more than 700 clients have left
Andersen); see also John R. Wilke et al., U.S. Warns Andersen of Indictment
Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2002, at A3 (stating that Merck & Co., Freddie Mac,
SunTrust Banks Inc and Delta Airlines are just some of the clients that have
dropped Andersen as their auditors).
152. See Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Andersen Exodus Might Be Near, WASH.
POST, Apr. 17, 2002, at El (stating that more than 80% of Andersen's 1,700 U.S.
partners are pursuing positions at other accounting firms or new companies); see
also Hull, supra note 12.
153. See Hull, supra note 12 (informing the SEC that Andersen's practice will
cease operations on August 31, 2002); Schmidt & Hilzenrath, supra note 6, at Al.
Before the convictions, Andersen was trying to "work out a disciplinary
agreement with the SEC that would allow the firm to continue to audit publicly
traded companies." See Susan Schmidt, Enron Plaintiffs, Andersen to Talk,
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2002, at El.
154. Andersen Fined $500,000 for Obstructing Justice, REUTERS, Oct. 16, 2002.
155. See Michael Brick, Andersen Seeks Graceful Exit to Leases, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 12, 2003, at C6. See also Delroy Alexander, Andersen Offices' Art for Sale;
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A. Arthur Andersen's Document Retention Policy
Andersen developed its current document retention policy
after the government investigated its questionable accounting for
Waste Management, Inc. in 1998.156 In settling the investigation,
the SEC forced Andersen to pay a fine and accept an injunction
forbidding the firm from future wrongdoing.157 Since the majority
of the damaging information against Andersen in the Waste
Management case came from the firm's own files, the firm created
a policy wherein all unnecessary files would be destroyed.' In
February 2000, Andersen created its current policy, which required
employees to preserve audit work in a central file, while related
documents are to be destroyed once they became unnecessary.'59
The Executive Summary of Andersen's document retention
policy states that the purpose of the policy is to protect confidential
information, to retain such information in order to support or
defend the firm's work and to destroy the information when it is no
longer needed." The policy requires that "only essential
information to support [the firm's] conclusions should be
Auction May Raise $1 Million, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2002, at Ni.
156. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Misread Depths of Government's Anger,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at Al.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information, supra note
10, §§ 3.1.1, 3.1.2. Andersen, however, tried to cut costs by dismissing some
employees who worked on the document destruction and by June of 2001,
accountants in Houston were buried in documents that should have been
shredded under the policy. See Eichenwald, supra note 156, at Al.
160. See Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information, supra note
10,
§ 2.0. Of course, the policy has now come under fire, as Representative Billy
Tauzin, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, has urged
Andersen to reconsider its policy of leaving matters related to the preservation of
documents to auditors. "'If all your policies are to let accountants decide when it
is legal to destroy documents in a pending investigation, an awful lot of people
are going to be in trouble down the road,' he said. 'If you don't change it, I
promise you, we will."' Tom Hamburger & Jonathan Weil, Andersen Knew of
"Fraud" Risk at Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A3.
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retained." '' Notably, "it is the engagement partner's responsibility
to assure compliance with these standards."162 The policy states
that "all working papers should be retained for six years and then
destroyed," but that the period "is predicated upon the legal
statutes of limitations in the United States." '163
When discussing destruction guidelines, the policy declares
that once Andersen is notified of "litigation or subpoenas
regarding a particular engagement, the related information should
not be destroyed."'" The policy also maintains that destruction
should be delayed and retention extended if there are "regulatory
agency investigations (e.g., by the SEC), pending tax cases, or
other legal action in connection with which the files would be
161. See Practice Administration: Client Engagement, supra note 10, § 3.4.1.
Information having relevance to our opinion or findings should be part of the
central client engagement files. Drafts and preliminary versions of memos and
reports, superseded workpapers, backup diskettes, and other types of
information not in the central client engagement files should be destroyed when
they are no longer useful to the engagement and no later than when the
engagement is completed. Draft versions of documents should be discarded or
deleted at the time the final document is completed.
Id. § 3.5.3. John Ormerod, Andersen's "top man" in the United Kingdom, stated
"[w]e don't have a shredding policy .... Our policy is to retain the documents
which support our opinion. We don't retain the ones that are unnecessary."
Don't Mention the Shredding, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 2002, at P30.
162. Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information, supra note 10,
§ 3.4.3. David Duncan was the engagement partner for the Enron account.
163. Id. § 4.4.1. It is interesting to note that in the legislative history discussing
section 1520, Senator Leahy states that if the "clear requirements" of section
1520, with its five year period to retain workpapers, had been in place "countless
[Andersen] documents might have been saved from the shredder." 148 CONG.
REC. S7419 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Yet the
Andersen policy itself requires a longer retention period for its audit papers, so
this new section may not have made a difference.
164. Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information, supra note 10,
§ 4.5.4. Once any Andersen employee learns of the institution of legal action or
threatened legal action against Andersen or its personnel, prompt notification
should be made to the Chicago legal office and the relevant area office of
Andersen's legal group. See Practice Administration: Notice of Threatened or
Actual Litigation, Governmental or Professional Investigations, Receipt of a
Subpoena, or Other Requests for Documents or Testimony (Formal or
Informal), Statement No. 780, § 2.0, at http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Mar.
11, 2003).
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necessary or useful." '165 In these cases, the policy notes, the
material in the Andersen files cannot be altered or deleted.
Other Big Five accounting firms' policies are similar to
Andersen's, but the wording varies slightly in each policy. Deloitte
& Touche LLP requires the firm's employees to maintain "working
papers which document the principal work performed, and the
conclusions reached, by the auditors." '166 Ernst & Young LLP's
policy requires the retention of records on audit engagements for a
minimum of six years, a time requirement that the other Big Five
firms, including Andersen, follow.67 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
pronounces in its policy that "any documents that are created or
received by the firm that are necessary or appropriate to record or
support the firm's professional work" must be retained.'68
B. The Destruction of Documents and the Relation to the Policy
The saying goes "the devil is in the details"-but here "the
devil is in the dates"-the dates when Andersen learned of the
SEC investigation. On October 12, 2001, four days before Enron
announced massive losses, Nancy Temple, an Andersen attorney in
the firm's Chicago headquarters, sent the infamous e-mail stating
that "[i]t might be useful to consider reminding the engagement
team of our documentation and retention policy. It will be helpful
to make sure that we have complied with the policy."'69 Nancy
165. Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information, supra note 10,
§ 4.7.1.
166. Jonathan Weil, Questioning the Books: Two Andersen Employees
Believed Enron Shredding Was Firm's Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002, at Cl.
167. See id.; see also Ingersoll, supra note 25, at 164 (noting that at the larger
accounting firms audit documents are kept for six years "because you never know
what might come up"). With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, all substantive audit
documents must be preserved for five years. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
168. Weil et al., supra note 144, at Al.
169. See E-mail from Nancy Temple, Attorney, to Michael Odom, Andersen
Partner (Oct. 12,2001), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/business/daily/transcripts/twoemails andersenl0l20l.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2003) [hereinafter Temple e-mail]. During the government's closing arguments
at trial, the prosecution argued that the policy was simply a cover for the
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Temple sent the e-mail to Michael Odom, a partner and head of
risk management in Houston, who then forwarded it to David
Duncan, another partner and the lead auditor for the Enron
account.17 At this point, shareholders of Enron had already filed
suits against the company and the SEC was beginning to informally
inquire about the corporation. 7' Shortly after receipt of the e-mail,
Andersen employees in Houston led by Duncan proceeded to
expedite the destruction of Enron-related documents, with the
exception of the Enron audit workpapers wherein the auditors'
conclusions were contained.' Duncan also organized an urgent
meeting to coordinate the destruction of Enron-related records on
October 23, 2001. 73 The SEC launched a full formal investigation
into Enron on October 31, 2001 and followed with a subpoena to
shredding of documents. See Kurt Eichenwald, Summations in Andersen's
Criminal Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at C1. The government also stated that
suddenly in October following the policy became a major priority, while in reality
it was to prevent impending litigation against the firm. Id.
170. See Temple e-mail, supra note 169; see also Eichenwald, supra note 156,
at Al (documenting the stages of destruction in October, this story states that
Odom reminded his accountants on October 10, 2001 about the importance of
destroying documents, after which they immediately went back to their desks and
deleted a large amount of e-mails).
171. See Susan Schmidt, Prosecutors, FBI Pore Over Enron's Books, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at A6. Temple herself recognized that the possibility of suits
against Enron was great. See Michael Schroeder, Probe of Andersen Lawyer Is
Sought-House Panel Wants To Investigate If Temple Lied About Enron Role,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2002, at A6. Twenty-one minutes after sending her e-mail
regarding the document policy, she opened a litigation-tracking account for the
Enron matter, wherein she noted: "Enron expects to announce a $1.3 billion
charge in the third-quarter." Id.
172. See Ken Brown et al., Paper Trail: Andersen Fires Partner It Says Led
Shredding of Enron Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at Al (citing people
close to Duncan who said that no documents were destroyed before the e-mail
was sent).
173. See Eichenwald, supra note 156, at Al (noting that the message of
October 23, 2001 was to get all files into compliance with the document retention
policy). In the three-day period of October 23 to October 26, 2001, twenty-six
trunks of documents, as well as twenty-four boxes, were destroyed, compared
with the destruction of less than one trunk for the three previous weeks in
October. See id.
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Andersen on November 8, 2001.M The destruction of documents,
however, did not stop until November 9, 2001,75 a day after the
SEC sent Andersen a subpoena seeking all of the firm's Enron-
related documents, when Duncan's assistant sent an e-mail to the
office stating "stop the shredding."'76
While the management in Andersen's Chicago headquarters
maintained that the Temple e-mail was a reminder of the firm's
standard policy, 177 the management of the Houston office, including
Duncan, considered it an authorization to begin shredding
documents. 178 After acknowledging that Andersen employees did
destroy documents pertinent to the SEC inquiry, Andersen's senior
management in Chicago placed the blame on the poor judgment of
partners in the Houston office working on the Enron account.'79
Duncan and Odom, however, maintained that the document
destruction began only when the e-mail from Temple reminded the
Houston office of the document retention policy.80
174. See Hilzenrath & Schmidt, supra note 150, at Al.
175. See Eichenwald, supra note 156, at Al. Temple also sent an e-mail to the
Houston office on November 10, 2001 telling Andersen employees to preserve
documents, "suggesting that Andersen's legal department did not explicitly tell
auditors to start preserving documents related to Enron's audit until nearly three
weeks after Enron disclosed that the SEC was looking into its finances." Susan
Schmidt & Kathleen Day, Testimony Is Sought on File Shredding, WASH. POST,
Jan. 20, 2002, at A5.
176. Hilzenrath & Schmidt, supra note 150, at Al.
177. See Peter Behr, Manager Says Enron Shredded Documents, WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 2002, at Al (discussing that former Andersen CEO Joseph P. Berardino
stated that the Temple e-mail was a reminder "because accountants are pack
rats .... We save lots of stuff that's not relevant.").
178. See Brown et al., supra note 172, at Al. Andersen fired Duncan, stating
that he led an expedited effort to destroy documents after learning that the SEC
was investigating Enron. Id. Duncan has defended himself by stating that he was
merely following the instructions in the Temple e-mail. Id.
179. See Tom Hamburger & Jonathan Weil, Second Executive Tells of
Andersen E-mail, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at A3. "These activities [of Houston
employees] were on such a scale and of such a nature as to remove any doubt
that Andersen's policies and reasonable good judgment were violated."
Hilzenrath & Schmidt, supra note 150, at Al.
180. See Hamburger & Weil, supra note 179, at A3; see also Susan Schmidt &
April Witt, U.S. Refuses to Clear Andersen, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2002, at El
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The firm's management has continuously denied that the
October 12, 2001 Temple e-mail was a veiled order to begin
destroying Enron documents."' The destruction of documents
became even more furious after a meeting on October 23, 2001,
where Duncan directed an expedited effort to shred Enron-related
documents.'82 Moreover, Temple admitted knowing of the SEC
investigation of Enron and Andersen's work for the company by
October 23, 2001 but asserts that it was the responsibility of the
engagement partner, Duncan, to ensure that the document
retention policy was followed.8 3  Nevertheless, during
Congressional investigations Duncan stated that he learned of the
SEC investigation of Enron on either October 19 or 20, 2001, but
Andersen employees continued destroying documents until
November 9, when Temple ordered the Houston office to retain all
paperwork." l Andersen finally suspended its document
destruction policy on January 10.185
Andersen was indicted on charges of obstruction of justice
under 18 U.S.C. section 1512.186 The firm was charged with
(according to two Houston Andersen employees, "an unusual number of Enron-
related documents were destroyed" after the receipt of the Temple e-mail on
October 12, 2001, specifically on the weekend of October 13-14).
181. See Schmidt & Witt, supra note 180, at El.
182. Milo Geyelin, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2002, at C1. Duncan has
subsequently pleaded guilty to illegally destroying documents in October 2001.
See Susan Schmidt & Carrie Johnson, Andersen's Troubles Mount of Two Fronts,
WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2002, at Al. During his plea, Duncan told the court that
"[diocuments were in fact destroyed so that they would not be available to the
SEC. I also personally destroyed such documents. I accept that my conduct
violated federal law." Id.
183. Jaret Seiberg, Lawmakers Bash Andersen, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 24, 2002.
184. See id.
185. Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Kathleen Day, Andersen Officials Grilled on
Shredding, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al.
186. See David 0. Stephens, Lies, Corruption, and Document Destruction, 36
INFO. MGMT. J. 23 (2002). At the time of the indictment, sections 1519 and 1520
of Title 18 had not yet been created because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was
passed on July 30, 2002, mainly in response to the Andersen case. Id. These
sections would have allowed federal prosecutors to take a more direct shot at
Andersen's obstruction, since the two sections specifically target document
destruction by accountants, instead of using the more obscure section 1512. Id.
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widespread criminal conduct for destroying a multitude of records
about its Enron audit.'87 The indictment asserted that Andersen
had non-public information from which the firm could reasonably
anticipate litigation; information such as their internal knowledge
of Enron's business losses, a memo from an Enron employee
addressing concerns about the corporation, and the firm's own
hiring of an experienced law firm to complete an internal
investigation."8 Further, according to the Justice Department,
Andersen partners personally directed the widespread destruction
of documents immediately after they learned of an SEC
investigation. 9 At trial, the only major issue of dispute between
Andersen and the government relating to the document
destruction was whether anyone at Andersen was acting with the
purpose of impeding a government investigation," ° as required
under section 1512."'
Ultimately, a federal jury found Andersen guilty of
obstruction of justice for impeding a SEC investigation into the
187. See Schmidt & Hilzenrath, supra note 6, at Al.
188. See Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP (No. H-02-0121),
at http://news.findlaw.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
189. See Schmidt & Hilzenrath, supra note 6, at Al (noting that shredding of
Enron documents occurred in Andersen's Portland, Ore., Chicago and London
offices as well). Under section 1512, prosecutors needed to prove three things in
order to convict the firm of obstruction: 1) that Andersen persuaded employees
to destroy Enron-related audit documents; 2) that whoever gave these orders
intended to impair the SEC investigation of Enron; and 3) that highly placed
individuals at the firm were culpable, because according to the DOJ's own tough
internal guidelines for charging a corporate this is required to implicate the whole
firm. See Geyelin, supra note 182, at Cl.
190. See Stephens, supra note 186, at 23.
191. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Testimony Ends With Denial of Ill Intent,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at C8. One important legal point that came out of the
case was the ruling by the trial judge, Melinda Harmon, that the jury may find the
firm guilty of obstruction, even if they could not agree on which of the firm's
employees had the criminal intent. Id. Thus, each juror could find a different
employee with the requisite intent and still find the firm as a whole guilty of
obstruction. See Kurt Eichenwald, Judge's Ruling Hurts Defense, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2002, at Cl. Nevertheless, the jury ultimately agreed on a single person
as possessing the criminal intent to obstruct justice-Nancy Temple. Eichenwald,
supra note 5, at Al.
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finances of Enron.'92 According to a few of the jurors, however, the
decision to convict was based on an instruction by Temple to
Duncan to alter a memo, rather than specifically for the document
destruction or shredding.9
IV. ANALYSIS
Having a document retention policy is a standard procedure
for almost all corporations.' But other than saving a corporation
money by not having to store and retain numerous unnecessary or
outdated documents, what can a policy really do for a
corporation?'95 Could it protect a corporation from being charged
with obstruction of justice because it instructs on a routine
destruction of documents?..6 Can document retention policies be
reconciled with federal obstruction of justice laws?1"
A. How Can One Reconcile Document Retention Policies With
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes?
Document retention policies request that a business enterprise
destroy documents. Conversely, obstruction of justice laws seek
the inherently opposite position, since they are designed to protect
documents from being destroyed. Truth-seeking, impartiality, and
the honor of the judicial and governmental system seem to
necessitate more legal control over document retention policies
because such policies are designed to destroy documents relevant
to potential litigation.'9  On the other hand, practical
considerations, such as the costs of retaining documents and the
192. See Hull, supra note 12.
193. See id. Temple wanted Duncan to remove her name from a memo that
discussed problems with how Enron classified earnings in a press release. Id. In
the opposition to Andersen's motion for a new trial, "prosecutors allege her
motive was to remove reference to the fact that Andersen may have concluded
the press release misleading, but did nothing about it." Id.
194. See generally supra note 1.
195. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
196. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
197. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
198. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 278.
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administrative burdens of retention, must be taken into account.'99
Regardless of this apparent contradiction, these two opposite
behaviors should be able to co-exist as long as a document
retention policy is not designed to deliberately interfere with the
federal government or pertinent litigation.
A balance can be struck between the fairness sought by
obstruction of justice laws and the practicality of document
retention policies. This balance can be achieved if a well-designed
policy is: a) suspended when a corporation learns that litigation or
an investigation into the corporation is imminent; b) the
corporation then reinstates the policy as to irrelevant or
unnecessary documents regarding the investigation or litigation
proceedings;' c) and is fully reinstated once the investigation or
litigation proceedings are over, thereby making the process cost
effective while at the same time complying with the government
and the essence of fairness.
A well-designed policy or document retention program that
would not run afoul of the obstruction of justice laws involves
numerous considerations. First, the policy should be created at a
neutral time, when litigation or an investigation is not pending or
foreseeable."' By creating a policy in advance, a corporation will
not appear to be creating a sham policy designed with the primary
intention of eliminating documents that relate to the litigation or
investigation. Next, the policy should divide each type of
document or file into categories and then assign a retention period
for each category.2' The retention periods should be consistent
with applicable federal laws, including employment, labor, tax and
audit retention laws that require retention of certain documents for
199. See id. at 275-76 ("Routine destruction can lower storage costs by
reducing the volume of retained documents. Cataloging and uniform filing can
lower the cost of record retrieval and thereby the cost of compliance with
discovery requests.").
200. See id. at 279 (discussing the balance between preserving documents to
promote fairness and allowing their destruction to avoid undue expense and
noting that this balance must be struck with great care).
201. See Shaheen, supra note 17, at 27.
202. See Barker et al., supra note 24, at 49.
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specific amounts of time. 3 Significantly, document destruction
cannot be selective, but rather must be consistent. The policy
should also clearly describe the document destruction procedures
in order to give all personnel an idea of what to do with the
documents they receive or create.' Furthermore, the policy should
state what corporate personnel need to do when litigation or an
investigation commences, the occurrence of which triggers the
obstruction of justice laws.
Managing the document retention program is just as important
as the policy itself. Once a policy is created, it is up to the
corporation's management and legal advisors to ensure that the
policy is strictly and routinely followed. 5 Management must make
certain that all personnel are aware of the policy and the
procedures to follow. If there is confusion among employees, an
open dialogue between the employees and those in charge of the
policy must occur. By requiring strict compliance, management
must ensure that the policy is consistently followed and not
haphazardly adhered to.
Pendency of a proceeding is an integral element to find a
violation according to the three federal obstruction of justice
statutes that deal with document destruction. 6 Thus, once a
corporation has notice of a pending investigation or official
proceeding, it should immediately suspend any document retention
policies." If a corporation does so, it will not interfere in the
203. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 309; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (noting the new time period for
audit workpaper retention).
204. See Barker et al., supra note 24, at 49.
205. Id. In the Andersen case, the evidence at trial established that there was
a breakdown of internal procedures at the firm, not only in regards to the
document retention policy, but as to accounting principles as well. See Kurt
Eichenwald, Early Verdict on Audit: Procedures Ignored, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6,
2002, at C6. This led to "an atmosphere of recklessness among some of the
accountants" at the firm. See id.
206. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512 (2002).
207. Although sections 1519 and 1520 do not require pendency of a
proceeding, these two statutes still require an investigation of the matter by a
federal agency or a bankruptcy filing, so the suspension of a policy should still
occur once a federal department or agency has jurisdiction. See Sarbanes-Oxley
20031
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administration of justice because it no longer will be using the
policy that requires destruction of records and documents. The
corporation may not have a duty to suspend its policy, but it would
obviously be risking an obstruction charge if the policy continued
and documents relevant to a proceeding are destroyed."' To
ensure that all employees have knowledge of the suspension in
order to prevent any destruction of documents in violation of
sections 1503, 1505 and 1512, management must effectively
communicate with personnel regarding the policy's suspension.
Pendency of an official proceeding is not as crucial under
section 1512, which eliminates the pendency requirement to some
extent,2°9 or in courts that allow pre-subpoena obstruction
convictions.21 The cases suggest that corporations and their
employees should not use formal pendency as the threshold at
which they would suspend document retention policies as courts
are flexible with this requirement.2 1 1  Even high-ranking
government attorneys believe that "an official proceeding does not
have to be pending in order for someone to come within the ambit
of the obstruction of justice statute." ' Therefore, even before a
subpoena has been issued, a corporation or its employees can still
obstruct justice.1 If a corporation has knowledge of a likely
subpoena or investigation, it should either suspend its policy or
reconfigure it to guarantee that no relevant documents are
eliminated, regardless of whether a proceeding is pending or not.
Once an appropriate policy is in place, the best argument a
Act § 802.
208. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 276 (discussing an enterprise's
vulnerability to criminal charges if a policy is not suspended).
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd
mem., 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156 (4th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1991).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1975);
Fineman, 434 F. Supp. at 202; Gravely, 840 F.2d at 1160; Ruggiero, 934 F.2d at
450.
212. See Lindorff, supra note 20.
213. Because of the addition of section 1519, this is more true than ever, since
section 1519 punishes destruction or alteration of documents in even a
"contemplated" matter or case. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802.
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corporation can make in order to reconcile its policy with
obstruction statutes is that because of a consistently applied and
routinely followed retention policy, the corporation did not have
the specific intent to obstruct justice as required by federal law. By
using a policy that is consistent in its application rather than
selectively applied, a pre-existing policy appears to eliminate the
specific intent of impeding the administration of justice because the
policy is not intended to impede a specific proceeding."' It can be
argued that there is a lack of intent because the policy was drawn
up well in advance of any potential litigation or contemplated
investigation so that an enterprise's employees were following set
instructions that apply across the board. Nevertheless,
corporations that are involved in a potentially litigious business15
should maintain more documents or create a retention-friendly
policy because destroying documents before the relevant statute of
limitations runs on a potential claim appears to be bad faith and
may indicate specific intent. 6 Additionally, once a corporation
learns of litigation or an investigation, adherence to a policy may
create the appearance of specific intent to destroy relevant
documents.
All in all, document retention policies can be reconciled with
obstruction of justice laws. Whether it be a legal defense, such as a
lack of specific intent due to consistent application, or a policy
defense, such as the exorbitant costs of retaining all documents,
arguments can be made that adherence to a document retention
policy does not obstruct justice. All previously discussed sections
of Title 18, including those added by Sarbanes-Oxley, involve a
litigation or investigatory context, an inappropriate time to destroy
documents. However, as long as the policies are being utilized
during non-litigation or non-investigative circumstances, such
214. See Fedders & Guttenplan, supra note 63, at 54.
215. Although it may be obvious for certain corporations depending on what
business the enterprise is engaged in, this is a vague standard in most cases.
216. See Reingold v. Wet N' Wild Nevada, Inc., 944 P.2d 800, 802 (Nev. 1997)
(determining that the spoliation inference in a civil case should be given because
a water slide company that routinely destroyed its records after one year
appeared to destroy documents intentionally because claims against the company
were reasonably foreseeable).
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policies will not oppose the federal obstruction laws.
B. Did Arthur Andersen's Document Retention Policy Protect the
Firm Against Obstruction of Justice? Will It in the Future?
A conviction for obstruction of justice seemed likely under
section 1512(b), the section under which the Department of Justice
charged the firm.217 Much of the document destruction occurred
after Andersen learned of the SEC investigation and possibly even
after the subpoena was served.1 8 If this was done with the intent to
impede an official proceeding, then the firm's chances to receive an
unfavorable verdict were high.219 Ironically, however, the jury
convicted the firm not for this destruction of a vast amount of
documents with thousands of sentences, but for removing a few
sentences from an internal memorandum discussing how Enron
should characterize certain third-quarter losses in a press release.' 0
The unanimous verdict of the jury was based solely on this
removal, and not on the shredding of documents in October 2001.2'
217. See Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP (No. H-02-0121),
at http://news.findlaw.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2003). This conviction seemed
likely because Andersen admitted that the firm's employees destroyed
documents. See Weil et al., supra note 144, at Al.
218. Weil et al., supra note 144, at Al.
219. It is interesting to note that during David Duncan's plea statement to the
court, he stated that "[d]ocuments were in fact destroyed so that they would not
be available to the SEC." Schmidt & Johnson, supra note 182, at Al.
220. Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Al. The jury foreman said that the smoking gun
that led to the conviction was the e-mail sent from Nancy Temple to David
Duncan suggesting that he remove the paragraph in his memorandum that stated
his disagreement with the Enron characterization of certain third-quarter losses.
Id. "The jury agreed that Ms. Temple had 'corruptly persuaded' Mr. Duncan to
alter information for the purpose of impeding an official proceeding," and thus
convicted Andersen. Id.
221. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Team Weighs Asking Judge to Undo
Guilty Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at Cl; Joseph Weber, Commentary:
The Lingering Lessons of Andersen's Fall, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, July 1, 2002
("[U]ltimately, the jury set aside most of the government's accusations, even
largely disregarding the shredding efforts the govermnent had made so much
of."), available at
DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
The jury's reason for conviction notwithstanding, Andersen's
document retention policy should have protected the firm for any
document destruction before the firm learned of the SEC
investigation during the third week of October, as being the typical
applications of the policy." Since the firm admitted to destroying
documents after it learned of the investigation, however, anything
destroyed from that date onward would not be protected by the
firm's policy. In fact, the sensible approach would have been to
suspend the policy immediately after learning of the investigation
around October 17 or 18, 2001, or even earlier when they learned
of possible trouble with Enron in late September and early
October.m An internal report conducted by Andersen declared
that the policy was flawed because it created the impression that
Andersen employees were permitted to destroy documents even
after litigation was anticipated.'4 Because the policy lacked clarity,
according to Andersen, the firm ended up destroying relevant
documents that may not have been destroyed if a clear policy was
in place.
The question remains as to whether or not Andersen's
retention policy was really unclear. At the very beginning of the
policy, the Executive Statement announces, "[i]n cases of
threatened litigation, no related [client] information will be
destroyed."2' Additionally, section 4.5.4 states that "[i]n the event
the Arthur Andersen Business Unit is advised of litigation or
subpoenas regarding a particular engagement, the related
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_26/b3789017.htm (last visited
Mar. 11, 2003).
222. Nevertheless, under an expansive view of section 1512(b), specific
document destruction may bring about an obstruction conviction if the firm knew
of alleged wrongdoing and could reasonably anticipate an investigation or
litigation into relevant accounts. See United States v. Conneaut Industry Inc., 852
F. Supp. 116 (D.R.I. 1994) (taking an expansive view of pendency and intention
and allowing circumstantial evidence to show knowledge of potential future
proceedings).
223. Schmidt & Hilzenrath, supra at note 6, at Al.
224. See id. This internal report of the shredding was given to the Department
of Justice. Id.
225. Practice Administration: Client Engagement Information, supra note 10,
§ 2.0(9).
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information should not be destroyed. 22 6 These statements appear
to be clear-when litigation is possible, all related client
information should be preserved. Contrary to Andersen's internal
report, this policy does not give the impression that documents
could be destroyed even after litigation is anticipated. If the
employees were unaware that litigation was on the horizon, then
they would not have adhered to the policy. Nevertheless, the
policy itself appears clear regarding document retention procedure
when litigation is threatened. It is possible that the Houston office
was not even using the policy at all, as Duncan remarked that he
and others destroyed documents to avoid turning them over to the
SEC.' If that was the case, it seems that Andersen's policy is fine
and it is the lack of adherence to it that caused the confusion.
Moreover, the management of the document retention
program may have been more flawed than the policy itself. When
the legal department in the Chicago headquarters e-mailed the
Houston office on October 12, 2001, they did not specify precisely
what was meant by "remember the firm's policy.""8 The lack of
clear communication may have been more of a problem than the
policy itself. Consequently, the Andersen employees in Houston
had no clear guidance as to the next correct step and most likely
destroyed pertinent documents. 9 In fact, the jurors said that the
shredding was not the issue in their decision, because they were
"convinced that it was not intended to hinder a government inquiry
but was a good faith, if misguided, effort to comply with internal
policies" at Andersen.' Instead, according to the jury's foreman,
226. Id. § 4.5.4.
227. See Schmidt & Johnson, supra note 219, at Al. It is interesting to note
that while he did destroy documents, Duncan may not have done so in order to
hinder any government investigation. According to the testimony of David
Stulb, head of Andersen's Fraud and Investigative Unit, Duncan didn't
understand the legal ramifications of document retention or destruction because
he did not have such legal training. See Jonathan Glater, Witness Cites Confusion
in Shredding at Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2002, at C4.
228. See Temple e-mail, supra note 169.
229. Of course, they may have done the shredding on purpose, and therefore a
document retention policy really would not matter anyway.
230. Jonathan Glater, Jurors Say File Shredding Didn't Factor Into Verdict,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at A22.
DOCUMENT RETENTION POLICIES
"[t]he shredding simply showed that 'Andersen hadn't trained its
people very well."''
CONCLUSION
Document retention policies, used in virtually all business
organizations, serve many practical purposes. On the other hand,
these policies authorize the elimination of documents that may
prove relevant in a judicial or administrative proceeding, thus
presenting the opportunity to impede the due administration of
justice. Nevertheless, the practical reasons of cost and
administrative savings for organizations that use them and the fact
that the policies may prevent future litigation because of a
document taken out of context weigh heavily in favor of having
such a tool. These policies are necessary for business purposes and
can be reconciled with federal obstruction laws if the policy is
clear, consistently applied and correctly managed. As long as the
policy is suspended during litigation, a bankruptcy filing or an
official investigation or matter, times when the policies of fairness
and truth-seeking are of the utmost importance, the balancing of
the two sides will allow such document retention policies to be
available for organizations to use.
231. Id.
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